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Abstract 
 
Images can be generated in all sensory modalities. Nevertheless, research on the 
everyday use of mental imagery, for example in autobiographical memory tasks, has 
suggested that it is only visual images which facilitate memory retrieval (e.g. 
Williams et al., 1999). If this is the case, individuals born without sight may be forced 
to rely more on verbal encoding (Goddard & Pring, 2001).  This paper explores the 
presence and everyday role of nonvisual sensory imagery in 16 individuals with and 
16 without sight.  Using a cue word paradigm, contrary to previous research, 
experiment 1 suggested that for both the blind and sighted nonvisual imageries have a 
significant a role to play in the generation of autobiographical memories. These 
results were reinforced by similar findings in experiment 2, which used the same cue 
word method to explore the role of visual and nonvisual (auditory) imagery when 
generating future events.  The results refute the claim ‘useful’ imagery in everyday 
tasks is exclusively visual.    
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When people are asked to describe their images, they will often report them as vivid 
and experienced in all sense modalities (e.g. Betts, 1909; Johnson, 1980; Cornoldi, 
Calore & Pra-Baldi, 1979; Kerr & Johnson, 1991).  Indeed, there is now a substantial 
body of research linking mental imagery function with the primary perceptual 
processing areas not only for ‘visual’ imagery (e.g. Farah, 1988; Kosslyn & Ochsner, 
1994; Kosslyn, Pascual-Leone, Felician, Camposano, Keenan, Thompson et al., 1999) 
but also for nonvisual imageries (e.g. Halpren & Zatorre, 1999; Levy, Henkin, Lin, 
Hutter & Schellinger, 1999).  Thus, imagery is a cross-modal experience for which it 
is general agreed that although it is not synonymous with perception, they are closely 
connected (e.g. Kosslyn, 1994; Pylyshyn, 2002).   Although there has now been 
considerable research exploring how imagery works, there is a less well defined 
literature exploring what role imagery plays in everyday cognition. 
 
One way in which it has been suggested which imagery may serve everyday cognition 
is by facilitating the retrieval of information from memories of complex events, 
specifically, from autobiographical memory (Conway, 1988, 1996; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Autobiographical memory is memory for information related 
to the self (Brewer, 1986).   It is comprised of biographical and personally 
experienced events and facts.  It includes memory for the names of teachers whilst at 
school; for the dates during which the individual was employed at place ‘a’, ‘b’ and 
‘c’; it involves memory of going on holiday to New York, and the specific memory of 
being in Time Square on one particular day during that holiday.  It has been suggested 
that a pool of sensory-perceptual and spatio-temporal event features make up the 
lowest level in the organisational hierarchy of autobiographical memory – the event 
specific knowledge (ESK) base (Conway & Rubin, 1993).  These specific events, to 
which these pieces of information relate, exist over minutes or hours. For example, 
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the first visit to Time Square during a visit to New York.  They do not exist as an 
independent, discrete unit stored in a holistic form. Rather, memories for specific 
events are constructed.   
 
It is thought that imagery is crucial to the process of remembering specific 
autobiographical events (see Brewer, 1986; 1988b; Conway, 1988; 1992; Robinson, 
1992; Anderson, 1993 cited by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, Williams, 1988).  
Conway (2001) suggests a very direct relationship between sensory-perceptual 
episodic memory and autobiographical memory’s event related knowledge base.  
Conway argues that episodic memories are only retained when they become linked to 
more permanent pre-existing autobiographical memory structures.  In other words, if 
the sensory-perceptually encoded episodic event has salience for understanding of the 
self then the sensory perceptual information will be subsumed into the ‘event specific 
knowledge’ pool.   
 
Despite the evidence indicating that imagery is experienced in multiple sensory 
modalities, researchers have almost always concluded that it is visual imagery that 
plays the crucial role in autobiographical memory.  It seems that when participants are 
asked to describe details of events that they remember, the information is almost 
always in the form of visual images (Anderson (1993 – cited by Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000).  Visual imagery may be used to elicit more details about an event 
(Robinson, 1992); the presence of visual imagery may also make a memory feel more 
vivid (Rubin, Schrauf & Greenberg, 2003).  In line with this, recent brain imaging 
research has found activation within the occipital cortex, during autobiographical 
memory retrieval (Conway, Turk, Miller, Logan, Nebes, Meltzer & Becker, 1999; 
Conway, Pleydell-Pearce & Whitecross, 2001; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross 
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& Sharpe, 2003).  In a review of the neuropsychological data, Greenberg & Rubin 
(2003) conclude that visual imagery is crucial to autobiographical memory function.   
 
Brewer (1988a, b) also claims a highly significant role for visual imagery in 
autobiographical memory, based on a study in which he asked participants to describe 
autobiographical memories. However, it is interesting to note that as well as 
containing visual images, Brewer’s (1988b) results also indicate a significant 
proportion of the autobiographical memory descriptions contained strong smells, 
tastes and textures. It could therefore be argued that when these modalities play a 
notable role in the original event, they may well be important to the subsequent 
autobiographical memory retrieval.  Nevertheless, in a study looking at the efficacy of 
different imagery modalities, cued by verbal labels, in stimulating autobiographical 
memory retrieval, Williams, Healy & Ellis (1999) did not find tactile, olfactory, 
gustatory or motor cues had any facilitatory effect on memory retrieval.  Rather, only 
visual imagery was found to have a major role in memory retrieval, with auditory 
imagery playing a minor role.   
 
An interesting question arises from the general finding that visual imagery is key to 
autobiographical memory retrieval. If visual imagery alone is involved in specific 
autobiographical memory retrieval, how will this affect the retrieval of such memories 
by individuals born totally blind?  If vision were necessary for optimum retrieval of 
all autobiographical memories, given the proposed significance of autobiographical 
memory to the function of the ‘self’ (see Conway & Plydell-Pearce, 2000), the vision 
impaired brain would be forced to develop compensatory processes to develop some 
level of autobiographical memory.  Goddard & Pring explored the issues of 
specificity and memory retrieval time in both children (Goddard & Pring, 2001) and 
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adults (Pring & Goddard, 2004) with a profound visual impairment.  Goddard & Pring 
(2001) suggested that individuals without sight might have more difficulty with 
specific memories. This conclusion was based on both the large levels of prompting 
and the paucity of information retrieved by the visually impaired children who 
participated in the study.  A reliance on verbal mediation, for example in the use of 
verbal ‘scripts’, was the proposed explanation for this deficit (Goddard & Pring, 
2001).  However, this early suggestion was not backed up by a larger, later, study 
carried out with adults (Pring & Goddard, 2004).  Here, no differences in memory 
specificity or retrieval time were found in either the cue word task (positive 
emotional, negative emotional and neutral words) or semi-structured autobiographical 
memory interviews.  In fact, in the semantic autobiographical memory recall task 
individuals without sight performed better than their sighted counterparts.  Whilst this 
may seem to contradict the earlier findings (Goddard & Pring, 2001), a proportion of 
the children in the first study had additional learning difficulties which may have 
affected their performance on this task. Pring & Goddard (2004) concluded that those 
born with and without sight may actually be using similar processes for 
autobiographical memory generation.   
 
This conclusion differs from the one reached by Ogden & Barker (2001).  They 
reported that whilst sighted participants describe mainly visual features (in line with 
the findings of Williams et al., 1999), the early blind reported mainly tactile, auditory 
and spatial features. Nevertheless, the research on autobiographical memory in 
individuals with a visual impairment seems to agree that neither are they impaired in 
their ability to retrieve specific memories, nor do they require longer retrieval times.  
Goddard & Pring (2001) explain these findings by proposing a more major role for 
verbal processing.   
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Experiment 1 explores the role of sensory imagery – visual and nonvisual – in the 
everyday task of remembering one’s past.  Adapting Williams et al.’s (1999) cue-
word task methodology, blind and sighted participants are asked to generate 
autobiographical memories in response to eight each of visual, auditory, tactile and 
low-imagery abstract words (taken from Eardley & Pring, in prep).  If Goddard & 
Pring’s (2001) verbal mediation hypothesis is correct, then it is expected that, similar 
to their study, no differences will be found in either specificity or retrieval time 
between those with and without sight.  Since their hypothesis also suggests a strong 
role for verbal processing in both groups, correlations between verbal fluency, verbal 
IQ, and memory specificity will be examined.  However, if imageability does enhance 
recall (Williams, 1988; Williams et al., 1999 – Experiment 1) and in view of both 
Ogden & Barker’s (2001) findings and the fact that those with and without sight rate 
the imageability of the four word groups differently (see Eardley & Pring, in prep), 
differences might be expected in the facility and specificity with which those with and 
without sight retrieve autobiographical memories in response to the word modes, even 
if no overall differences in specificity and retrieval time are found.  
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Sixteen sighted adults and sixteen individuals who were either born totally blind, or 
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were profoundly visually impaired from infancy participated in this study.  
Participants in each group were matched for age, gender, verbal IQ and verbal 
fluency.  Of those born totally blind or profoundly visually impaired from early 
infancy, 4 were male and 12 female. The mean age of participants was: 50.69 (s.d. 
14.13) and the mean verbal IQ (WAIS-RNI) was 115.38 (7.23).   The mean verbal 
fluency score was 18.35 (5.38).  The age at which participants lost their sight, their 
levels of sight before and following the loss and the medical diagnosis are detailed in 
Table 1 below.   
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The sighted participants all had normal or corrected to normal vision.  There were 4 
male participants and 12 female participants and the mean age of participants was 
47.94 (s.d. 12.00; range: 26-71).  An independent measures t-test revealed that there 
was no difference between the ages of the two groups (t (30) =0.59, p>0.1).  Verbal 
IQ measures provided a mean score of 115.69 (12.55).  An independent measures t-
test indicated that the groups did not differ on IQ (t (29.13)=0.86, p>0.1).  The mean 
verbal fluency score of participants was 16.58 (4.07).  An independent measures t-test 
demonstrated that verbal fluency did not differ across groups (t (30) = 1.05, p>0.1). 
 
Materials 
Three sets of high imagery sensory words and one set of low imagery abstract words 
were selected (see Eardley & Pring, in prep).  The words in the visual group were: 
Rainbow, Sunset, Clown, Moon, Mountain, Painting, Butterfly and Poster. The 
auditory words were: Ticking, Thunder, Whisper, Dog Bark, Bell, Laughter, 
Applause, and Fire Alarm.  The tactile words were: Sand, Fur, Slime, Ice, Wool, 
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Snow, Cashmere, and Tree Bark.  The abstract words were: Worth, Knowledge, Duty, 
Greed, Attitude, Thought, Upkeep and Moral.  
 
A stopwatch was used to record the response latencies.   
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that the research was interested in their memory for events that 
happened in their lives. They were told that they would hear a number of words, and 
for each one they would be asked to remember an event from their own lives that the 
word reminded them of, as quickly as possible.  The event could have occurred at any 
time in their life, and that it could be trivial or significant.  It was emphasised that the 
memory they describe needed to be for a specific event that occurred on one particular 
occasion.  An example was given to distinguish between a specific event and a 
general event.  The experimenter suggested that they might be asked to think of a 
specific event that the word “party” party reminded them of.  They were then told 
“you could respond: “my birthday party last year, when my friend made me a really 
lovely chocolate cake”.  It was also pointed out that a response such as “my birthday 
parties where we eat lots of cake” would not be specific because it does not refer to 
one particular occasion.  Participants were told to try to describe a different memory 
for each cue word.    
 
Following this, the experimental procedure was briefly summarised again, 
emphasising that they should think of a specific event from their lives, as quickly as 
they could.  They were told that once they had thought of something, they should say 
out loud ‘stop’ or ‘yes’.  They were then told that they would have to briefly describe 
the event they have remembered.  Participants were then given an example. All cue 
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words were phrased within a question, which emphasised the need to think of a 
specific event, so the example was: “can you think of a specific event that happened 
on one particular day that coffee reminds you of?”  Following the examples, 
participants were told that they would have a maximum of 45 seconds to retrieve a 
memory. They were told not to worry about the time, that it would actually feel quite 
long when they were trying to think of a memory.  They were also told that some cue 
words would be easier than others, and not to worry if they didn’t have a memory in 
response to a particular word.  If they failed to generate a memory, the experimenter 
simply moved on to the next word. If a participant failed to generate a specific 
memory within the time period, a latency of 45 seconds was marked.  If a participant 
generated a general image, they were encouraged to try and think of a specific image.  
Irrespective of whether or not they achieved this, a latency of 45 seconds was 
recorded.   
 
Participants completed three practice trials and then proceeded to the experimental 
task.  Words were presented in two blocks of 16, with a short verbal task (verbal 
fluency) in the middle.   
 
 
Scripts were scored for specificity where by they were given S for specific, G for 
general, N for non-autobiographical and F when participants failed to generate an 
event of any kind. A quarter of the scripts were double marked by a researcher blind 
to the experimental hypothesis.   
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Inter-rater reliability  
Cohen’s Kappa was 0.81, p<0.001.  This indicated an excellent level of inter-rater 
reliability.   
 
Results 
    
Retrieval time – excluding failures  
When participants failed to generate a specific memory, producing instead either a 
general memory or a failure to retrieve any memory, this was marked as a ‘fail’ and a 
45 second latency was automatically given.  Although this enables the incorporation 
of the number of specific memories participants retrieved, it augments the actual 
speed with which memories were retrieved.   In order to get a more precise 
comparison of the time it took individuals with and without sight to retrieve specific 
memories for each modality of cue word, the response latencies excluding failures 
were analysed.  
 (Table 2 about here) 
 
In order to explore the pattern of specific memory generation a 2 (visual status) x 4 
(mode) mixed design ANOVA was carried out looking at the time taken to retrieve 
specific memories.  There was no main effect of visual status, although there may 
have been a trend towards the blind recalling fewer memories than the sighted (F (1, 
30) =3.27, p=0.081).  The main effect of mode was significant (F (3, 28) =11.59, 
p<0.001).  The interaction between mode and visual status was not significant (F (3, 
28) = 1.91, p>0.1).   
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Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons exploring the main effect indicate simply 
that participants took significantly longer to generate memories in response to the 
abstract words as compared to all other word groups (visual, mean difference: 4.41, 
p<0.001; tactile, mean difference: 4.55, p<0.001; auditory, mean difference: 3.72, 
p<0.001).  No other differences were found.  
 
Specificity 
Table 3 illustrates the number of specific memories generated by those with and 
without sight, in each sense modality, and out of a maximum of eight.     
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Normality checks on the number of specific memories recalled by participants 
indicated that whilst the data was approximately normal for participants without sight, 
the number of specific memories generated by those with sight could not be 
considered to be normally distributed.  This was partly due to the fact that for the 
sense modalities, sighted participants demonstrated a ceiling effect in the number of 
specific memories retrieved.  In view of this, the following tests are nonparametric.  
For all of the non-parametric tests reported in this article, excluding correlations, the 
Monte Carlo method was used to calculate the significance and was adjusted to take 
into account multiple tests. 
 
Firstly, looking at the difference in the total number of specific memories retrieved by 
those with and without sight, it can be seen that the sighted retrieve significantly more 
memories than do those without sight (Mann-Whitney U =24, z=-3.94, p<0.001).  
When comparing the number of specific memories retrieved by the two levels of 
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visual status for each modality, it can be seen that the sighted retrieve significantly 
more memories for abstract (Mann-Whitney U =29.5, z=-3.75, p<0.001), visual 
(Mann-Whitney U =53.5, z=-2.91, p=0.004) and auditory (Mann-Whitney U =52.5, 
z=-2.98, p=0.003) words.  For the tactile words, although there may be a trend in the 
same direction, this result does not reach significance (Mann-Whitney U =82.5, z=-
1.80, p=0.075).  
 
Friedman tests for K-related samples, looking at mode for each level of visual status, 
were carried out.  These showed a significant effect of mode for both the blind (chi-
square (3) =23.59, p<0.001) and the sighted (chi-square (3) =13.09, p=0.003).   
 
In order to limit the number of post-hoc pairwise comparisons exploring the 
difference between mode, for those with and without sight, performance on the visual 
word group was compared to the abstract, tactile and auditory words respectively.  
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests indicated that fewer specific memories were generated in 
response to the abstract words than the visual cues for both the blind (Wilcoxon-
Rank: z=-3.06, p<0.001) and the sighted (Wilcoxon-Rank: z=-2.45, p=0.016).  No 
other significant differences were found. 
 
Correlations 
Correlations were run between the verbal control measures and the different word 
categories. In view of the fact that the specificity scores were not normally 
distributed, Spearmans rho was used for all correlations.  For neither the blind nor the 
sighted did either the verbal fluency or verbal IQ scores significantly correlate with 
either the number of specific memories retrieved or the speed at which memories 
were retrieved.  Participants with sight showed a trend (-0.446; p=0.053) towards a 
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negative correlation between verbal fluency scores and the number of specific 
auditory memories retrieved.  However, when Bonferonni corrections are applied for 
multiple tests, this result is no longer close to significance.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 1 was designed to explore the role of imagery in the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories in those with and without sight.  No differences were 
found in the pattern of memory retrieval across word modality, for either specificity 
or retrieval time, between those with and without sight.  It was significantly harder 
and took significantly longer to retrieve a specific memory in response to the abstract 
words than any of the ‘sense’ modalities.  For neither visual status group were any 
differences found between either response latency or memory specificity for auditory, 
visual or tactile words.  This result suggests that the visual and nonvisual sensory 
modalities have an equally significant role to play in cuing autobiographical 
memories.   
 
For participants without sight, that there was no significant difference between the 
cuing potential of the visual, auditory and tactile categories of words is somewhat 
surprising since individuals without sight have less vivid images in response to visual 
cue words (Eardley & Pring, in prep).  However, a trend towards participants without 
sight remembering less specific memories, overall, than do sighted participants, was 
found.  This finding is in line with observations made by Goddard & Pring (2001), 
and when it is considered in conjunction with the fact that participants without sight 
remembered equal numbers of visual, auditory and tactile memories, it might suggest 
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a reliance on verbal processes.  However, if autobiographical memory were verbally 
mediated then correlations might be expected between performance on measures of 
verbal ability and autobiographical memory.  No such correlations were found 
between verbal ability and autobiographical memory retrieval time or specificity, for 
either those with or without sight.  In view of these findings, one could conclude that 
imagery ability seems to facilitate autobiographical memory retrieval.   
 
Yet, if imagery were being used by individuals without sight to cue autobiographical 
memories, it still raises questions about why an interaction was not found between 
sensory modality and visual status, since one would expect autobiographical memory 
retrieval from the visual words to be harder for the blind than the sighted.  A tentative 
explanation is suggested based on the fact that autobiographical memories, as distinct 
from images, must have relevance to the self.  One might conclude that a specific 
memory generated by a sighted person in response to the cue word “sunset”, for 
example, as well as having a visual component, will also have an emotional 
significance. If this event is experienced with someone without sight, then although 
the importance of the visual sensory experience will not be equivalent, it is possible 
that the emotional importance is. For example, one participant remembered being on a 
boat with her husband as the sun set.  Her memory of the boat experience included 
enjoying hearing his excitement at the beautiful sunset.  At the same time, she was 
able to experience directly other sensory experiences, for example the feeling of the 
air and moving on water.  In other words, different aspects of the same ‘sunset’ event 
will be encoded with different degrees of salience, depending on what the individual 
relates to.  Thus, even though sense specific images for typically visual phenomenon 
may be less readily available, and less vivid (Eardley & Pring, in prep), these sensory 
cue words may have cross-modal connections to other sensory or emotional 
 17 
encodings of self-related experiences which result in privileged access to 
autobiographical memories in individuals without sight, in comparison to low-
imagery cue words.  
 
In conclusion, it seems that imagery, visual and otherwise, has an important role to 
play in the autobiographical memory of the sighted.  That participants without sight 
generate equal numbers of memories in response to visual and nonvisual images is 
nonetheless problematic.  However, if the hypothesis of images associated with visual 
words is accepted, then it would seem that imagery also has a significant role to play 
for those born without sight.  A second experiment was carried out to explore further 
this hypothesis.    
 
Experiment 2 
 
The processes behind remembering past events – autobiographical memory – and 
imagining future events have been linked (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose & 
MacLeod, 1996; Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004).  In view of these apparent functional similarities, the evidence for a role for 
imagery within autobiographical memory strongly suggests that imagery may have 
some function to play in this future simulation process.    
 
This is not a novel suggestion, a role for imagery has frequently been cited as 
enabling humans to think about or imagine the future (Neisser; 1976; Shepard, 1978 – 
cited by Conway, 1988). For example, if you are planning a dinner party, how do you 
decide whom to invite?  How do you decide what foods you want to serve?   Perhaps 
the guests will be chosen by imagining how two people may get on, or ways in which 
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they would not get on.  Similarly, imagining how the foods will taste and how full you 
might feel at the end of the meal will help choose the menu.  The same underlying 
processes might be evoked when answering simple questions about the future such as 
“what time will you be home?” and “will you be able to pick up a video on the way?” 
Advocates of the ‘off-line processing’ or ‘simulation’ models argue that similar 
processes are evoked when carrying out the everyday task of imagining the future as 
when generating a fictional story (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Harris, 2000), or answering 
counterfactual questions (see Harris, 2000).   In other words, a mental model is 
created in which the current state of the world is altered according to the question or 
proposal, and predictions or decisions are made based on that mental model.   
 
Thus, imagining the future is an everyday task which may indeed involve imagery.  
However, as Conway (1988) rightly points out, the use of imagery as a way to provide 
information about possible future events evokes additional features other than those 
which would be required in autobiographical memory tasks, since it requires 
individuals to imagine the world in a novel way.   Taking this link into consideration, 
it is particularly interesting to note that the research has also suggested that images for 
imagined events are not only less vivid (Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988; 
Arbuthnott, Geelen & Kealy, 2002) but also they are less strongly linked with primary 
perceptual processes (see Conway et al., 2003).  The fact that images evoked in a 
future thinking task would be less strongly linked to perception may serve to polarize 
the role of direct sensory experience.  The ‘associated’ sensory and emotional 
experiences, which it is suggested the blind participants might be using to generate 
memories in response to ‘visual’ cue words, might be less easily accessible when 
imagining the future because the links to perceptual experience seem to be weakened 
(Conway et al., 2003).   
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Experiment 2 uses the same cue-word methodology to examine the effects of sensory 
cue words on the generation of events which might happen in the future. Based on the 
functional link between remembering events from the past and generating events in 
the future, it is thought that imagery will be found to play a role in this task.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants are the same as in Experiment 1, above.  
 
Materials 
The visual, auditory and low-imagery abstract words, detailed in experiment one, 
were used in experiment two.  In order that the experiment duration remained 
reasonable, tactile words were not included. 
 
A stopwatch was used to record the response latencies.   
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to have to think up situations or events 
that might realistically happen to them in the future.  
 
They were told that they would be given a list of cue words and that for each one they 
would have to try and imagine a specific event that would be reasonably likely to 
happen to them in the future. In order to reinforce the importance of specificity, all of 
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the words were presented in a neutral sentence, for example: “Can you think of a 
specific event which might realistically happen in the future which Fur reminds you 
of?”  It was stated that it might be something that could happen in the next couple of 
weeks, months or something that might happen years in the future.  It was stressed 
that it didn’t matter if the event was trivial or important, rather what they should focus 
on was trying to think of something specific that might be reasonably likely to 
happen.   
 
An example was given in which participants were told that for the cue word choir, 
they might try to think of a specific event which might happen in the future where 
they would hear a choir, for example, “attending the choir service on Christmas Eve 
next year with my family”.  They were told that “listening to a choir on the radio” was 
not specific because it did not refer to one particular day.  A second example was 
given, adapted for both groups.   Participants without sight were told that if the cue 
word was “clouds” they might say going on holiday to Scotland and hearing someone 
describe the clouds during a walk on a sunny day”.  The example was also suggested 
to sighted participants, however it was suggested that they would see the clouds 
during a walk on a sunny day.   
 
‘Realistic’ was explained by using the cue word ‘music’ as an example.  Participants 
were told that if their response to this cue word was that Cliff Richard might be a 
guest at their next birthday party - that would probably be extremely unlikely to 
happen.  However, if they said that they might be going to a Cliff Richard concert, 
then that might be reasonably likely to happen. 
 
Participants were asked to say ‘stop’ when they had thought of a specific event, and 
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then to describe it to the experimenter.  They were also asked to think of a different 
event for each cue word.  It was explained that they would be given a maximum of 
one minute to think of something, and if they were not able to think of anything in 
that time, then they would simply move on to the next cue word.   Two practice 
examples were given.    
 
All words were presented in one of two fixed random orders.  The order of word 
presentation for sighted participants was yoked to the order given to participants 
without sight.  
 
Scoring procedure 
 
The scripts were scored for specificity using the same principles described in 
experiment 1. Twenty five percent of the scripts were double marked by an 
independent researcher who was blind to the experimental hypothesis.  The inter-rater 
agreement was significant (p<0.001) and Cohen’s Kappa was 0.72.  Any future event 
over which the raters’ had disagreed was discussed and agreement reached.   
 
 
Results 
 
Response latency – excluding failures 
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The standard deviations (see Table 4) indicate that there was a considerable amount of 
difference in the speed with which individuals were able to generate a specific event 
that might occur on one particular day in the future.  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
A 2x3 mixed ANOVA was carried out.  Sphericity could not be assumed and so the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.  Both the main effect of mode (F (1.44, 60)
 
=3.46, p=0.055) and visual status (F (1, 30) =3.45, p=0.073) did not quite reach 
significance.  As with the autobiographical memory data, the interaction between 
mode and visual status is not significant (F (1.44, 60) =1.19, p>0.1).  
 
Specificity 
As with the autobiographical memory data, normality could not be assumed and as 
such non-parametric pair-wise comparisons were carried out, using the Monte Carlo 
method to calculate significance. An exploration of the patterns of memory retrieval 
indicate an overall difference in specificity (Mann-Whitney U =24, p<0.001), with 
those with sight providing more specific future events.   
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
The significance level was adjusted to take into account multiple tests.  They showed 
that whilst the sighted were more specific than the blind for both abstract (Mann-
Whitney U= 71.5, p=0.029) and visual words (Mann-Whitney U=67.0, p=0.015), the 
difference did not quite reach significance for auditory words (Mann-Whitney 
U=83.0, p=0.068).   
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Interestingly the Friedman test for K-related samples, looking at mode for each level 
of visual status, revealed a significant effect of mode for both the blind (chi-square (2) 
=16.44, p<0.001) and the sighted (chi-square (2) =13.90, p<0.001).  As with 
Experiment 1 above, performance on the visual word group was compared to the 
abstract and auditory words respectively.  These comparisons showed that for the 
sighted, although more specific future events were generated for visual words than 
abstract (Wilcoxon-Rank: z=-2.97, p=0.002), this was not the case when comparing 
visual/auditory words (Wilcoxon-Rank: z=-0.26, p>0.1).  For participants without 
sight, the pattern was slightly different.  Here, specific future events were more easily 
generated for the visual words than abstract (Wilcoxon-Rank: z=-2.09, p=0.04).  
However, the visual words were significantly less likely to elicit a specific event than 
were the auditory words (Wilcoxon-Rank: z=-2.01, p=0.048).   
 
Correlations 
Nonparametric correlations were carried out using Spearman’s rho.  There was a trend 
towards a negative relationship between verbal IQ and the generation time of auditory 
events (r=-0.483; p=0.058).  Again, if a Bonferonni correction for multiple tests were 
used, this result would no longer reach significance.  Taken together, these results 
support the claim that imagery is being used by individuals born without sight.   
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Looking at the nonparametric correlations for individuals with sight, there is a 
significant negative correlation between the number of specific visual events 
generated and verbal fluency (r=-0.572, p=0.021); if a Bonferonni correction were 
applied this would loose significance.  No other correlations reached or approached 
significance. 
 
Discussion 
 
Comparative to the autobiographical memory task, the future event generation task 
required a more active imagination component.  It was suggested that the effect this 
would have would be to reduce the usefulness of ‘associated’ imageries, thus 
highlighting differences in sensory experience in a way which was not possible for the 
autobiographical memory task. In line with this prediction, the facilitatory effect of 
each group of words, for the blind and sighted, mirrored their imageability ratings 
(see Eardley & Pring, in prep).  The effects of sensory modality on the everyday task 
of future event generation showed that whilst people with sight have most difficulty in 
generating future events in response to abstract cue words, no differences are found 
between the auditory and visual words.  In other words, sighted people can make 
equal use of visual and nonvisual imagery to generate future events.  This result 
mirrors the findings of the autobiographical memory task and strongly suggests that 
nonvisual sensory imageries, as well as visual imagery, have an important role to play 
in everyday tasks. 
 
For participants without sight, imageability played a clear role in the level to which 
the cue words facilitated the generation of a future event.  Individuals without sight 
found it harder to generate future events in response to the abstract words than to the 
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visual words; individuals without sight also found it harder to generate a response to 
the visual words than they did to the auditory words.  These results are in line with 
previous imageability ratings of the words and reflect the fact that for ‘visual’ 
experiences non-visual images are sometimes evoked, albeit weaker than the visual 
images evoked by sighted people (Eardley & Pring, in prep).   
 
This result supports the claim that both individuals who were blind and sighted were 
using imagery to facilitate the generation of possible future events.  Further 
reinforcement for this conclusion comes from an examination of the pattern of 
correlations between the verbal measures and the sense modalities of the cue words.  
The correlation data demonstrated that, once corrections for multiple tests were 
applied and similar to the autobiographical memory task, verbal processes had no 
significant role to play in this task.  Thus, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
nonvisual imageries have a significant role to play in this task, for both the blind and 
sighted.   
 
 
General Discussion 
 
The aim of this research was to explore the role of nonvisual imageries in everyday 
cognition.  What is clear from this research is that those born without sight do make 
use of sensory images since high imagery cue words generate significantly more 
memories than do lower imagery items.  Furthermore, in the sighted, nonvisual 
imageries, for example tactile and auditory imagery, have been shown to have an 
important role to play in the retrieval of autobiographical memories and in the 
generation of future events.  In other words, irrespective of visual experience, 
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imagery, and not verbal processes, is crucial to the retrieval of autobiographical 
memories and the way in which the future is imagined or planned for. This is an 
important finding because although autobiographical memory models, for example 
Conway (1988, 1996; 2001; see also Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), suggest a role 
for sensory imagery, previous research has only been able to identify a role for visual 
imagery (e.g. Williams et al., 1999).   
 
It is possible that this model might be expanded further.  Experiment 1 tentatively 
suggested that where sensory experience was limited, for example in response to 
visual cue words by the blind, emotional imagery may serve a compensatory role for 
the reduction in sensory stimuli.  Evidence already suggests that the way emotional 
words are understood is in reference to the self and as a consequence, emotionally 
charged words are much more likely to produce autobiographical memories, even 
when these are not specifically required (Conway, 1990).  Autobiographical memories 
high in emotionality also evoke significantly more details than do memories in which 
emotionality is low or nonexistent (Lyman, Bernardin & Thomas, 1980).  In view of 
this, it is interesting to note that Rubin et al`s (2003) research on autobiographical 
memory vividness.  They suggested that visual imagery might have a special role to 
play in the vividness of generated images.  Rubin et al. (2003) found that, for sighted 
participants, visual imagery was the best predictor, in multiple regressions, of the 
degree to which an image was relived.  There were a very small number of exceptions 
to this rule.  In these cases visual imagery played no part in the imagery experience 
and it was emotional imagery which was crucial for reliving the memory.  Similarly, 
Conway & Bekerian (1988) found that emotional intensity was one of the two main 
factors predicting the vividness of memories.  If emotional imagery does have an 
important role to play in the retrieval of autobiographical memories in the blind, and 
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perhaps also in the sighted, one might ask where these details are stored and how they 
fit into current autobiographical memory models.  Similar to sensory imagery, 
emotional details may be stored in the event specific knowledge (ESK) base, 
providing an additional level of representation.  If this were the case one might expect 
emotional memories to have connections to sensory details.  However, whilst 
emotional memories may be more vivid and detailed than are neutral memories, they 
are not necessarily more laden in sensory detail (Schaefer & Philippot, 2005).  
Evidently, further exploration is needed.  
 
Whilst the results of both experiments support the general conclusion that imagery is 
being used by the blind and sighted, it is still the case that there was a trend towards 
the sighted generating more specific events, both remembered from the past or 
projected into the future, than do the blind.  This research was carried out with a 
clinical sample and in view of the extreme rarity of congenital blindness, has achieved 
a strong sample size. All the same, it should be noted that there were large individual 
variations both in terms of the time taken to generate a response and also in the 
number of specific responses given.  In view of this, it is possible that a difference in 
the levels of specificity between the blind and sighted does factor, but was not 
identified by this research.  Previous research has failed to identify such a difference 
between those with and without sight (Pring & Godard, 2004; see also Ogden & 
Barker, 2001).  Thus, even if the trends towards a lack of specificity in the event 
retrieval and generation reported here were genuine, the large level of individual 
differences and the previous failures to find such a difference suggest that the effect 
size is likely to be small, and difficult to demonstrate conclusively.  
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Overall, these results provide important evidence showing that nonvisual imagery has 
a role to play in everyday cognition.  Nevertheless, further research is need to attempt 
to untangle the specific roles of visual and nonvisual sensory imageries, as well as 
exploring the question of emotional imagery and multimodality in remembering the 
past and imagining the future. 
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Table 1: Participant demographics – individuals born totally blind 
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 Sex Age Age at loss of 
sight 
Residual sight Medical Diagnosis 
1 F 50 Birth Light/shade Retinopathy of Prematurity 
2 F 54 Birth None Retinopathy of Prematurity 
3 M 66 Birth Light shade till 
40 
Optic Atrophy 
4 F 23 Birth Light/shade Retinopathy of Prematurity 
5 F 51 Birth Light/shade Retinopathy of Prematurity 
6 F 23 Birth Light/shade Retinopathy of Prematurity 
7 F 28 9 months 1st 
eye, both 2 yrs 
None Retinal Blastoma 
8 F 54 Birth None Retinitus Pigmentos, 
Lebers Atrophy, Kerry 
ticomas, Nistagmus 
9 M 54 Birth None Retinopathy of Prematurity 
10 F 51 Birth None Mother had Rubella 
11 F 58 Birth Light/shade Retinopathy of Prematurity 
12 M 64 Birth Used to have 
light/shade 
Congenital Glaucoma 
13 F 55 1 ½  None Unspecified viral infection 
14 M 58 Birth Light/shade Lebers disease 
15 F 70 Birth None Microphthalmia 
16 F 51 18 months – 
deterioration 
from 5 months 
None Pseudo Glaucoma 
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Table 2:  Mean and standard deviations of time taken (in seconds) to retrieve a 
specific autobiographical memory 
 
Mode  
Abstract Visual Tactile Auditory 
Blind 14.46 (5.96) 10.87 (5.86) 9.94 (4.01) 9.47 (3.99) Visual 
Status Sighted 12.04 (4.77) 6.89 (3.42) 7.46 (3.42) 9.37 (3.63) 
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Table 3:  Mean and standard deviations of number of specific autobiographical 
memories retrieved, by blind and sighted, for each level of mode (maximum 8) 
 
Mode  
Abstract Visual Tactile Auditory 
Blind 3.00 (1.26) 5.50 (1.59) 6.12 (1.93) 6.19 (1.22) Visual 
Status Sighted 5.88 (1.78) 7.19 (1.28) 7.19 (0.83) 7.37 (0.81) 
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Table 4:  Mean and standard deviations of time taken (in seconds) to generate a 
specific future event 
 
Mode  
Abstract Visual Auditory 
Blind 20.10 (9.57) 14.36 (4.11) 13.83 (3.56) Visual 
status Sighted 14.41 (8.23) 11.99 (7.51) 13.34 (6.73) 
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Table 5:  Mean number of specific future events generated (Mann-Whitney U test), by 
blind and sighted, for mode (maximum 8) 
 
Mode  
Abstract Visual Auditory 
Blind 4.56 (1.41) 5.88 (2.00) 6.81 (1.05) Visual 
status Sighted 6.00 (1.86) 7.38 (0.96) 7.44 (0.89) 
 
 
